A short response and a few thoughts in regards to the pro-choice acorn analogy
"To hinder a birth is merely a speedier man-killing"1
This blog post is merely a resource I've created for myself that is useful for the response to somewhat unique/uncommon pro-choice arguments/analogies I have heard in an experience I had with a learned pro-choice person.
I will be paraphrasing and condensing Christopher Kaczor's responses to objections against the view that the human embryo is a person, and thus deserves fundamental human rights and respect. I think being able to paraphrase and summarize academic level work done on the topic condense/make it more accessible is very important. I would also like to point out that aside from the abortion debate, the moral status of a human embryo has importance within embryonic stem cell research discussions as well.
The acorn analogy
A very important objection raised against the pro-life view of the embryo as a human person comes by way of an analogy: Picture an acorn, although there is no momentous change during each stage of development of an acorn into an oak tree, it is still illogical to claim that the acorn is an oak tree. In the same way, says the pro-choice advocate, there is no momentous change during each stage of development of a zygote to a person, so likewise it would still be illogical to claim that the zygote is a person.
The pro-choice advocate will then proceed to ask a question, which, under the right assumptions (albeit ones opposed to the Christian worldview) seem to make sense if answered according to a pro-choice worldview. This question is stated as follows:
The size of an embryo's entire existence is no larger than a grain of rice, how can its value be equal to mine?
The acorn analogy against embryonic personhood blurs and thus admits that the exact cut-off point between human non-persons and human persons is difficult or even perhaps impossible to determine. The acorn analogy can also be rephrased. Rosalind Hursthouse says "Imagine a green patch left in the direct sun day after day, which over a long time fades to blue. There is no exact moment when the green patch turns to blue, but it is fallacious to argue that the patch must have really been blue all along. Similarly, the human being gradually becomes the person that is the healthy adult person. There is no “magic moment” of personhood, but we need not assume from the lack of such moment, that the human being from the very beginning of life is a person"1
Response
So, how can one committed to the sanctity of life of the unborn embryo begin to respond to the acorn analogy? As Kaczor describes, there are at the bare least two ways of understanding this analogy. The first is the supposition that the acorn's transition to an oak tree involves a substantial change, and the second is that it does not. If a person supposes that the transition involves a substantial change, namely that the acorn is one kind of thing, and the oak tree is another, then it becomes clear that the analogy is faulty in a number of ways. Here is one of those ways:
Unlike a dormant and passive acorn (supposing this view of an acorn is correct), a human embryo is an organism that is actively in self-development and growing towards full maturity. The issue is whether the human embryo is the same kind of thing substantially and in the ethical realm, as a human being at later developmental stages. Thus, the pro-choice advocate cannot appeal to the acorn analogy without begging question. By way of contrast, suppose that "acorn" is merely a passing phase in the development of a substance with moves through its lifespan from its inception, as an acorn, into a sapling, and then into the full maturity of an oak tree. In other words, assume that the transition from an acorn to an oak tree involves no substantial change, but merely the growth and development of the very same thing. If by "person" what is being referred to is a "mature member of the human species" then of course, no human embryo is a person! But then again, neither would be my one year old nephew because he isn't a "mature member of the human species" in the strictest sense. The analogy then, would be: "An acorn is to an oak tree as an embryo is to an adult".
This reduction to absurdity shows the necessity of the analogy's falsehood. The respect of a human life from its conception does not commit the pro-life advocate to the idea that all human beings are equally developed, or that acorns are oak trees, or that embryos are adults. While there is undoubtedly difference between the two in terms of maturity, the difference does not impact personhood. My baby nephew is an immature human in comparison to a full grown adult, but he is no less a person than the adult.
But what about the other version of the analogy, where the patch of green fades into blue?
While it is true that no non-arbitrary line separates the green fading patch from the blue, and it is also true that the green patch as not blue all along, at issue is if the human, from the beginning of his or her life, is a person. So to simply assert a negative answer to this question by way of analogy is logically fallacious and begs the question.
As green is not blue but can slowly change into blue, so a very young human being is not an adult human being, but, instead, changes into an adult human being. This analogy in and of itself does not serve to justify the view that not all human beings are persons. Here is another reduction to absurdity. Imagine that instead of the debate being about abortion, it is now about infanticide. (Which God forbid the pro-choice advocate you are speaking to thinks is morally permissible). Critics of infanticide point out that while there are many differences between an adult and a newborn, none of these are morally significant in the determination of the right to life of the newborn.
The defender of infanticide establishes that the newborn baby is not a person by arguing from the following premises: 1, the process of development from infancy to adulthood adamants no non-arbitrary moment when personhood is somehow "realized" (as in the green to blue patch analogy). and 2, the newborn baby is not an adult person. While both of these premises are true, the conclusion of the pro-infanticide advocate, namely, that the baby lacks the right to life, does not follow. The baby is not an adult person, but it's immaturity, again, does not itself show that the baby has no right to life.
While there are many stages of development between infancy and adulthood, none of these are relevant to personhood. In the same way, so too there are many stages of development between an embryo and an infant, but none of these are relevant to personhood.
To quote from Kaczor's work, the acorn analogy works only if one: "disregards the key proposition asserted by opponents of embryo- killing: that all human beings, irrespective of age, size, stage of development, or condition of dependency, possess equal and intrinsic dignity by virtue of what (i.e., the kind of entity) they are, not in virtue of any accidental characteristics, which can come and go, and which are present in human beings in varying degrees. Oak trees and acorns are not equally valuable, because the basis for their value is not what they are but precisely those accidental characteristics by which oak trees differ from acorns. We value the ugly, decaying oak tree less than the magnificent, still flourishing one; and we value the mature, magnificent oak more than the small, still growing one. But we would never say the same about human beings."2
Conclusion
Unlike acorns and oak trees, unlike patches of green that fade to blue, human value is dependent not on performance or maturity. It is foolish to say that destroying an acorn is no different than destroying an oak tree, but, at the same time, it is foolish to say that destroying my city's 200-year-old oak tree is the same as destroying a small oak sapling. (by virtue of the 200-year-old oak's greater majesty and maturity). While there is certainly a difference here, it is a difference the pro-life advocate can accept. Why? Because it does not prove that somehow there is a glaring difference in killing a mature human being and an embryo that necessitates the lack of the embryonic personhood, in the same way that killing a mature human being and a toddler are equal violations of their personhood and right to life and don't necessitate stripping away the toddler's personhood.
Truly, we cannot allow the physical growth of a human to define its personhood and right to life. This thinking is absolutely dangerous, and I think in the future I'll do some writing about why it is so dangerous. Thanks for reading! (Although I don't expect many to read this, I enjoyed writing it).
1. Tertullian, Apology 9:6
2. Hursthouse 1987, pp. 36-38
3. Kaczor 2005, pp. 92-92
Sorry english teacher, I don't care about my citation format :/